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Res Ipsa Loquitur
(Or Why the Other Essays Prove My
Point)
Suzanna Sherry
As all the Roundtable essays note, DaimlerChrysler asks the
Supreme Court to decide whether and when the in-forum activities of
a corporate subsidiary should give rise to general personal jurisdiction
over the corporate parent. My four co-contributors provide four
wonderfully different perspectives on that question. And what those
different perspectives should tell us is³as I argued in my original
contribution³that it would be a mistake for the Supreme Court to
decide that question in this case.
On the difficult question of exactly when a court should impute
the activities of a subsidiary to the parent for purposes of general
jurisdiction, I read my co-contributors as answering never (Erichson),
almost never (Childress), sometimes (Silberman), and always
(Neuborne).1 Reading all four essays together leaves almost no room
for further argument, as each author·s arguments are effectively
countered by another author.
Neuborne argues that limiting jurisdiction based on the
formalities of corporate separateness is ´using the corporate form to
erase the rule of law,µ2 while Erichson contends that exercising
1.
(ULFKVRQDUJXHVWKDWDFRUSRUDWLRQFDQQHYHU´EHat home WKURXJKDQDJHQWµDQGWKXV
that general jurisdiction can never be imputed that way. Howard M. Erichson, The Home-State
Test for General Personal Jurisdiction, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 81, 94 (2013). Childress
VXJJHVWV WKDW WKH ´GHIDXOW UXOHµ VKRXOG OLPLW MXULVGLFWLRQDO LPSXWDWLRQ WR FDVHV LQ ZKLFK ´D
FRUSRUDWLRQ·V DIILOLDWH LV UHDOO\ MXVW WKH FRUSRUDWLRQ LWVHOI LWV ¶DOWHU HJR· µ 'RQDOG ( &KLOGUHVV
General Jurisdiction and the Transnational Law Market, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 67, 79
 6LOEHUPDQSRLQWVWRWKHRFFDVLRQDOFDVHLQZKLFKWKH´EXVLQHVVRIWKHVXEVLGLDU\
relDWH>V@FORVHO\WRWKHEXVLQHVVWKDWJDYHULVHWRWKHFODLPDJDLQVWWKHSDUHQWµVXJJHVWLQJWKDW
imputation of general jurisdiction is appropriate in such cases. Linda J. Silberman,
Jurisdictional Imputation in DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman: A Bridge Too Far, 66 VAND. L.
REV. EN BANC     )LQDOO\ 1HXERUQH FDXWLRQV DJDLQVW D UHWXUQWR ´WKH QLQHWHHQWK
FHQWXU\·V PHWDSK\VLFDO DSSURDFK WR ¶FRUSRUDWH VHSDUDWHQHVV· µ DQG VXJJHVWV WKDW WKH &RXUW
´VKRXOG EH QLQH-]LS RQ WKH DWWULEXWLRQ WR 'DLPOHUµ RI WKH California activities of its American
subsidiary. Burt Neuborne, *HQHUDO-XULVGLFWLRQ´&RUSRUDWH6HSDUDWHQHVVµDQGWKH5XOHRI/DZ,
66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 95, 104, 108 (2013).
2.
Neuborne, supra note 1, at 102.
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jurisdiction despite the formalities of corporate separateness is
politically illegitimate because the corporate parent does not have a
sufficient relationship with the forum state.3 Silberman urges a ´more
functional approach . . . that does not rely on formal notions of agency
at all,µ4 while Childress wants a highly formalist approach that
depends on whether the subsidiary and the parent are ´alter ego[s].µ5
Consistent with her functional approach, Silberman also prefers a
balancing test, even to the point of folding the current specific tests
back into the all-things-considered approach of International Shoe.6
The other three, in contrast, see a need for a bright-line rule.
The take-away point from all of this squabbling is that the
Court is likely to do more harm than good if it decides the imputation
question before it absolutely has to. And, as I argued in my original
essay, it doesn·t have to in DaimlerChrysler.
The only remaining question is one discussed by several of the
Justices at oral argument:7 Did DaimlerChrysler waive the argument
that California lacks personal jurisdiction over it because MBUSA·s
contacts are not sufficient to create general jurisdiction? Although the
Ninth Circuit noted that DaimlerChrysler ´[did] not dispute that
MBUSA is subject to general jurisdiction in California,µ8 two
independent reasons nevertheless allow the Supreme Court to rest its
decision on insufficient contacts between MBUSA and California.
First, the Court has always drawn a distinction between
waiver of claims (or objections) and waiver of arguments. In Yee v.
City of Escondido9 the Court noted that ´[o]nce a federal claim is
properly presented, a party can make any argument in support of that
claim;; parties are not limited to the precise arguments they made
below.µ10 DaimlerChrysler clearly raised the objection that California
courts could not exercise personal jurisdiction over it. The company is
permitted to make all three arguments in support of that single claim:
MBUSA·s contacts cannot be attributed to DaimlerChrysler;; it would

3.
Erichson, supra note 1, at 91.
4.
Silberman, supra note 1, at 125.
5.
Childress, supra note 1, at 79.
6.
See Silberman, supra note 1, at 131² ´$UHWXUQWRWKHPRUHWUDGLWLRQDOInternational
Shoe formulation . . . underscores the need for balancing D VWDWH·V LQWHUHVW LQ DVVHUWLQJ
MXULVGLFWLRQLQOLJKWRIWKHGHIHQGDQW·VFRQWDFWVZLWKWKHIRUXPµ 
7.
See Oral Argument at 6:15²7:14 (Ginsburg), 7:15²8:24 (Kagan), 23:1 (Ginsburg), 38:19²
39:9 (Kennedy), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/11-965_l647.pdf.
8.
Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 914 (9th Cir. 2011).
9.
503 U.S. 519 (1992).
10. Id. at 534. See also Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 530
U.S. 238, 245 n.2 (200  GLVWLQJXLVKLQJEHWZHHQDFODLPDQGD´WKHRU\µVXSSRUWLQJLW 
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be unfair to exercise jurisdiction;; and California cannot exercise
general jurisdiction over MBUSA.
Second, the Ninth Circuit·s finding of personal jurisdiction
rests on attributing to DaimlerChrysler the contacts that MBUSA has
with California, not on transferring a finding of general jurisdiction
from the subsidiary to its parent: ´The question is whether MBUSA·s
extensive contacts with California warrant the exercise of general
jurisdiction over [DaimlerChrysler].µ11
The Court must decide,
therefore, whether MBUSA·s contacts with California are sufficient to
make DaimlerChrysler ´at homeµ in that state. The contacts might be
unable to do so for either of two reasons: either they cannot be
attributed to DaimlerChrysler, or, even if they are attributed to
DaimlerChrysler, they are insufficient to confer general jurisdiction
under Goodyear. DaimlerChrysler has preserved both of these
arguments by objecting to the exercise of general personal jurisdiction
based solely on the actions of its subsidiary. The second argument is
no different from a determination that the contacts are insufficient to
confer general jurisdiction over MBUSA, the position that my original
essay urges on the Court.
Having conceded that there is little new to say because the
other four essays successfully annihilate one another (which leaves
ducking the question as the Court·s best option), and that nothing
prevents the Court from resting its holding on a lack of general
jurisdiction over MBUSA, I should stop here. But the editors have
allotted me 2500 words, and I intend to use at least some of them to
pick nits.
First, I take issue with Erichson·s underlying approach to
personal jurisdiction. He argues that, as a matter of political
legitimacy, a forum has adjudicatory authority only over those who
purposefully affiliate themselves with that forum, either through their
conduct (for specific jurisdiction) or through their decision to establish
a home-state relationship (for general jurisdiction).12 But that is too
narrow an approach to the requisite affiliation. He never explains why
doing business in a forum and deriving revenue from that business
cannot be enough to make full adjudicatory authority legitimate.
States should be able to say: ´If you want our money, you must be
amenable to our judicial authority regardless of the subject matter of
the claim.µ He offers no justification for drawing the lines of political
legitimacy and judicial authority where he does. So the philosophical
argument from which he derives the rule that the acts of an agent can
never confer general jurisdiction is flawed.
11.
12.

Bauman, 644 F.3d at 920.
Erichson, supra note 1, at 84²86.
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Moreover, he would apply his ban on imputation even when the
non-resident parent corporation is a citizen of another state rather
than of another country.13 Both his argument from political legitimacy
and the resultant ban on imputation are especially problematic in that
situation. As Wendy Perdue pointed out more than twenty years ago,
´[i]nherent in our existence as a nation is that each state and its
citizens necessarily accepts the political legitimacy of all the other
states,µ so that ´[c]oncerns about political legitimacy might
appropriately underlie personal jurisdiction in the international, but
not in the interstate, context.µ14 In short, whatever the correct rule on
imputation, it should not depend on our current regime that
indefensibly allows arbitrary state lines to determine as a
constitutional matter where in the United States an American citizen
can be sued.
Second, there is still the issue of whether the imputation
question even arises in this case. If California did not have general
jurisdiction over MBUSA, then it is irrelevant whether MBUSA·s
activities in California can be imputed to DaimlerChrysler. And even
the two authors who seem most attentive to Goodyear and to the
differences between general and specific personal jurisdiction³
Silberman and Erichson³do not explain why the lack of general
jurisdiction over MBUSA is not dispositive of the case. Silberman
never mentions the problem. Erichson, although he calls the parties·
´assumptionµ of general jurisdiction over MBUSA ´questionableµ and
´misguided,µ15 does not view that as a ground on which to reverse the
Ninth Circuit.
In the end, what the four essays suggest is something that law
professors³and generations of law students³have recognized for
decades: the law of personal jurisdiction is a morass. The Court has
wavered between individual liberty and state sovereignty as a
justification for limits on personal jurisdiction, never convincingly
showing how either one is connected to the current two-part test for
jurisdiction. It has left the contours of both prongs of the test vague
and unpredictable. It has not explained why some purposeful acts are
sufficient to invoke jurisdiction and others are not. And every time it
decides a difficult case that might resolve some of these issues, it fails
to produce a majority opinion.

13. Id. at 90²92.
14. Wendy Collins Perdue, Personal Jurisdiction and the Beetle in the Box, 32 B.C.L. REV.
529, 547 (1991).
15. Erichson, supra note 1, at 92 n.37.
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In light of the Court·s past performance on personal
jurisdiction questions, I don·t have much confidence that a decision on
the imputation merits in DaimlerChrysler will shed much light on the
subject. It is much more likely to create more questions than it
answers;; or, alternatively, to dictate a short-sighted, all-encompassing
rule unjustified by any underlying principle. Perhaps the Court will
have to confront the imputation question eventually. But it should try
to sort out the mess it has made of basic personal jurisdiction issues
before it ventures into this more complex territory.

